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Transition patterns from school to work differ considerably across OECD countries. Some 
countries exhibit high youth unemployment rates, which can be considered an indicator of the 
difficulty facing young people trying to integrate into the labor market. At the same time, 
education is a time-consuming process, and enrolment and dropout decisions depend on 
expected duration of studies, as well as on job prospects with and without completed degrees. 
One way to model entry into the labor market is by means of job search models, where the job 
arrival hazard is a key parameter in capturing the ease or difficulty in finding a job. Standard 
models of job search and education assume that skills can be upgraded instantaneously (and 
mostly in the form of on-the-job training) at a fixed cost. This paper models education as a 
time-consuming process, a concept which we call time-to-educate, during which an individual 
faces the trade-off between continuing education and taking up a job. 
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Transition patterns from school to work diﬀer considerably across OECD
countries. Column (1) of table 1 shows that the percentage of youths com-
pleting upper secondary education ranges from 68 to 100 percent in OECD
countries.1 The percentage of the population within the age bracket 25-
34 and that have attained university education (tertiary-type A education),
which is displayed in column (2), depends on two factors: ﬁrstly, the tran-
sition rate between upper secondary education and university, and secondly,
on the survival rate in university, i.e. on the fraction of students complet-
ing their studies. The survival rate in university is displayed in column (3).
Several things are noteworthy about the survival rate in university: in all
countries, a number of students drop out of university without obtaining a
degree. On average, 30 percent of students in OECD countries do not com-
plete their studies. Part of the explanation for this phenomenon is probably
that some students give up because they realize that they are not ’college
material’. Another striking feature of column (3) is the considerable vari-
ation in survival rates across countries. While 94 percent of those starting
university in Japan manage to complete their degrees, only 42 percent of
students in Italy complete their studies. Taking the complement of survival
rates, we arrive at the dropout rate, which ranges from 6 percent in Japan to
a staggering 58 percent in Italy. This raises the question what are the driv-
ing forces between university enrolment and dropout behavior. One factor
which may be relevant in understanding the transition from school to work
is the youth unemployment rate, which can be considered an indicator for
the diﬃculty of youths to integrate into the labor market.
Our conjecture is that high youth unemployment rates at the time of
leaving high school may induce some youths to go to university (in particular
when tuition fees are low) who would not have done so in the case of more
favorable labor market conditions. These students may continue searching
for a job while enroled in university and may drop out once they receive a
job oﬀer.
1The table contains all OECD countries with non-missing information on the four
indicators.
2Table 1: Education and labour market indicators
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Belgium 79 18 60a 15.3
Czech Republic 81 12 61 16.6
Denmark 100 23 69 8.3
Finland 85 21 75 19.9
France 82 19 59 18.7
Germany 93 13 70 8.4
Iceland 79 23 73 4.8
Ireland 77 23 85 6.2
Italy 82 12 42 27.0
Japan 92 25 94 9.7
Spain 68 25 77 20.8
Sweden 72 22 48 11.8
United States 73 31 66 10.6
Country mean 81 19 70 12.4
Source: OECD Education at a Glance 2004 and OECD Employment Outlook:
Col. 1 displays upper secondary graduation rates (2002), i.e. the percentage of upper
secondary graduates to the population at the typical age of graduation in public and
private institutions
Col. 2 displays percentage of the population age 25-34 that has attained tertiary-type A
education (2002)
Col. 3 displays survival rates in tertiary-type A education (2000), i.e. the number of
graduates divided by the number of new entrants in the typical year of entrance in all
university programs
Col. 4 displays youth unemployment rates (2001), i.e. percentage of labour force aged
15-24 in unemployment
3In the next section, we formalize this idea in the form of a simple job
search model, in which education is explicitly modeled as a time-consuming
process, which we will call time-to-educate. This is a novel feature in the job
search literature, where education/training is usually modeled as a cost in the
value functions of either the worker or the ﬁrm, depending on who is assumed
to pay for the education/training (e.g. Mortensen and Pissarides, 1998, and
Pissarides, 2000). In many of these models, skills can be upgraded instanta-
neously at some cost c (see e.g. Coles and Masters, 2000, Masters, 1998).2
This is a reasonable assumption when the duration of training is negligible
(e.g. an intensive course of a month or so). It is clearly inadequate when ed-
ucation/training is time-consuming and when the focus is on understanding
transitions between employment, unemployment and education/training.
In the transition from high school to work, further education beyond
compulsory schooling is clearly a time-consuming process. After ﬁnishing
compulsory schooling, the decision to carry on with education depends on
the relative job prospects in terms of wages and employment probabilities at
diﬀerent education levels as well as on the time expected to obtain a further
degree. Time to completion varies considerably among individuals, especially
in university education (see Becker, 2001).
The plan of the paper is as follows. In the following main section, we
present a model of job search which introduces education as a separate labor
market status, thereby capturing the idea of time-to-educate and endoge-
nizing the (opportunity) cost of education. The ﬁnal section concludes and
discusses two empirical examples.
2 The model setup
Consider a continuous time model with two skill types, unskilled and skilled.
We can think of the skilled as holding a university degree and the unskilled as
being high school graduates without a university degree. The unskilled can
carry on with education, and obtaining a degree, they become skilled. Un-
skilled workers can be either unemployed, in education, or employed, while
2An exception is Malcomson, Maw and McCormick, 2003, who explicitly take into
account contract length of apprenticeship contracts. Their focus is, however, on ﬁrm
training while our focus is on formal (classroom) education.
4skilled workers can only be unemployed or employed. Denote by Uu the
expected present discounted value (PDV) of income of an unskilled unem-
ployed, and by Us the PDV of income for a skilled unemployed. By Wu and
Ws denote the PDV of being an unskilled employed and of being a skilled
employed, respectively, and by Eu the PDV of being an unskilled in educa-
tion. Uu, Us, Wu, Ws, and Eu can be given asset interpretations and their
relationship can be written in the form of arbitrage equations. Note that
we do not model the ﬁrm side here to save on space and for the clarity of
exposition.
Let b be the ﬂow value of income while unemployed, wu the wage rate
of the unskilled and ws the wage rate for the skilled, all of which are taken
to be exogenous.3 By r denote the rate of time preference. Assume that an
unskilled unemployed has a constant probability λu of ﬁnding a job at any
instant, and a skilled unemployed ﬁnds a job with instantaneous probability
λs. Then, we can write the asset equations deﬁning Uu and Us as
rUu = b + λu(Wu − Uu) (1)
rUs = b + λs(Ws − Us) (2)
Note that we could allow for for diﬀerent ﬂow values of income for the two
skill groups (bu 6= bs). This would, however, not give any signiﬁcant insights,
but would come at the price of more cumbersome notation.4 An unskilled
can take further education, in which case he receives job oﬀers with instan-
taneous probability ηu that he can accept or reject, and with instantaneous
probability γi he obtains a degree and becomes skilled.5 Note that the job
arrival and degree arrival processes are assumed to be independent, i.e. they
are ’competing risks’. Due to the search friction, newly graduated individuals
ﬁrst go through a spell of unemployment. Remark that γ is indexed by an
3Since the number of school-leavers entering the labor market is small compared to the
total labor force, we can reasonably consider school-leavers to be price-takers, with wu
and ws determined by the distribution of skills in the population.
4Actually, later on, we will even set b equal to zero, without loss of generality.
5Implicit in this setup is the assumption that only degrees matter and that some ed-
ucation but no degree is no better than no education at all. The assumption that only
degrees matter is known as sheepskin eﬀects.
5individual-speciﬁc index i, allowing for heterogeneity in ”degree achievement
rates”. This reﬂects the fact that the expected time for reaching a degree
varies considerably by individual. γi can be interpreted as individual ability
and the setup therefore reﬂects the idea that more able students obtain a de-
gree more quickly than less able students. Let be be the ﬂow value of income
while in education. In the case of an explicit ﬁnancial cost of education, be
may actually be negative. We can now write the asset equation deﬁning Eu
as
rEu,i = be + γi(Us − Eu,i) + ηu max(Wu − Eu,i,0) (3)
where we assume ηu < λu,6 in order to rule out the unrealistic feature that
no unskilled are ever observed in unemployment because always Eu,i > Uu.
Modelling education as a separate labor market status captures the idea of
time-to-educate and endogenizes the (opportunity) cost of education.
The asset equations for Wu and Ws are very simple:
rWu = wu (4)
rWs = ws = gwu (5)
where g > 1 measures the wage gap between skilled and unskilled workers.
The assumption implicit in equations (4) and (5) is that once the worker ﬁnds
a job he can keep it forever, so he never again faces unemployment.7
2.1 Solving the model
The model features two decision thresholds. Unskilled unemployed decide
whether to enroll or remain unemployed whereas enrolled individuals decide
whether to accept job oﬀers and drop out or whether to continue education.
We ﬁrst consider the decision to drop out of education, and then look at
the enrolment decision. To keep solutions at both margins tractable and in
order to focus on the most interesting eﬀects, we will set b = 0, without
6This may be reasonable if those in education have less time for job search than those
in unemployment.
7The model can be easily extended to allow for job destruction at the expense of more
cumbersome notation. This version of the model is available upon request.
6loss of generality. We will, however, let be ≤ 0, thereby allowing for explicit
ﬁnancial costs of education. This permits us to study the eﬀect of an increase
or decrease in tuition fees on enrolment and dropping out behavior.
2.1.1 The dropout margin
When a job oﬀer arrives, an unskilled individual in education can either ac-
cept or reject it. Given the heterogeneity in degree achievement rates/ability,
there will be a marginal type of individual who is exactly indiﬀerent between
continuing education and dropping out. For this individual, the condition
Wu = Eu,i holds. Solving equation (1) for Uu and equation (2) for Us and






















For the marginal individual, the last term in equation (3) disappears be-



































This expression deﬁnes a threshold value γd for an individual indiﬀerent
between continuing education and dropping out. For individuals with γi > γd
the last term in (3) disappears and they continue education until they obtain
a degree. For individuals with γi < γd both the second and the third term in
(3) are ”active” and whatever event comes ﬁrst (’competing risks’), degree
or job oﬀer, they turn skilled or they drop out.
We now want to see how changes in the parameters of the model aﬀect
individuals at the margin γd (and thereby also individuals oﬀ the margin).
7We can do so by applying the implicit function theorem to the following
equation which follows directly from equation (9):8
γd





gwu − wu = 0 (10)
All ceteris paribus changes have the expected impacts on the dropout
margin: holding all other parameters constant, a marginal increase in the
wages of the unskilled, wu, induces more people to drop out of education.
A marginal increase in the wages of the skilled, ws, or alternatively in the
wage gap g, provides an incentive for students to stay in university. As the
job arrival rate for skilled unemployed, λs, goes up, more students tend to
continue university. Notice that the job arrival rate for unskilled unemployed,
λu, does not enter the optimum. An increase in the discount rate, r, has a
negative eﬀect on staying in university. A decrease in tuition fees, i.e. an
increase in be ≤ 0, reduces dropout.
We can now turn to the entry margin.
2.1.2 The entry margin
Now, we want to consider the decision to enter university, i.e. ﬁnd the con-
ditions for Eu,i ≥ Uu. From the previous analysis (see equation (9)) we know
that the threshold γd is independent from λu. We can therefore distinguish
two cases: γi < γd, and hence Wu > Eu,i, and γi > γd, and hence Wu < Eu,i.
In the ﬁrst case, the last term in (3) does not disappear and we can write
Eu,i =
1
r + γi + ηu
[be+γiUs+ηuWu] =
1











From there, we can write the inequality Eu,i ≥ Uu as follows
ber
r + γi + ηu
+
γi










This equation deﬁnes a new threshold value γe < γd, that determines
whether an unskilled prefers to remain unemployed or to carry on with edu-
cation. If γi < γe, the chance of obtaining a degree is so low that it cannot
8Derivations for marginal eﬀects can be found in the appendix.
8trade oﬀ the lower job arrival rate in education (remember ηu < λu). If
γi > γe, the lower job arrival rate in education is set oﬀ by a suﬃciently high
degree achievement rate and therefore makes going to education worthwhile.
The second case is much simpler: since always Uu < Wu but at the
same time Wu < Eu,i in this second case, we ﬁnd Uu < Eu,i and therefore
everyone with γi > γd goes to education. This is self-evident after studying
the previous case: observing that γi > γd > γe yields the same result.
To sum up, there are three ranges of the ability parameter and three
corresponding decision rules: γi < γe: those with a very low ability choose
to remain unemployed instead of going to education; γe < γi < γd: in this
intermediate case, unskilled individuals choose to carry on with education but
drop out of education as soon as they obtain a job oﬀer; γi > γd: unskilled
individuals with high ability prefer education to unemployment and stay in
education until obtaining a degree even in the presence of job oﬀers.
Figure 1 illustrates the possible cases.
NOT IN UNIV. IN UNIVERSITY
not enrolled potential dropouts “stayers”




i g g <
d
i
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i g g > e g
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Figure 1: Possible cases in the model 
9Again, we can apply the implicit function theorem to equation (12) to see
how diﬀerent parameter values aﬀect individuals at the margin of enrolling in
university or remaining unemployed.9 Holding all other parameters constant,
a marginal increase in the wages of the unskilled, wu, induces more unskilled
to remain unemployed. In contrast, an increase in the wages of the skilled,
ws, or alternatively in the wage gap g, provides an incentive to more students
to enroll in education. In the same way, as the job arrival rate for skilled
unemployed, λs, goes up, more students enroll in education. An increase in
the job arrival rate for the unskilled unemployed, λu, increases the number of
people preferring to remain unemployed. An increase in be, i.e. a decrease in
tuition fees, increases enrolment, as expected. An increase in the job arrival
rate while in education, ηu, has an ambiguous eﬀect on enrolment. The most
likely case is the case of higher enrolment when ηu goes up, as one might
expect. However, there are parameter constellations, in particular when ws
and λs are high, for which an increase in ηu has the counter-intuitive eﬀect
of decreasing enrolment. This can be explained as follows: for potential
dropouts, i.e. those with γi < γe the ”utility” of enroling in university is
a weighted average of unskilled (outside) wage oﬀers and skilled wage oﬀers
upon graduation. Since outside wage oﬀers and degree arrival are ’competing
’risks’, an increase in ηu makes it less likely that the degree is completed
before the ﬁrst job oﬀer arrives. More weight is thus given to the unskilled
wages, which makes university ceteris paribus less attractive.
2.1.3 The dropout rate
In order to compute the fraction of dropouts, assume that γi is distributed
over the interval (0,∞) with distribution function F(γi). Then the expected
fraction of dropouts is given by
F(γd)−F(γe)
1−F(γe) .
Note that in a cross-section of individuals there are two margins aﬀect-
ing enrollment behavior: the unskilled can choose to enroll or not and the
enrolled can choose to accept job oﬀers when they arrive or to reject them.
Behavior of individuals at both margins jointly determines total enrollment
and dropout. Interestingly, comparative statics at both margins separately
give an unambiguous answer on enrollment and dropout behavior. For in-
9The derivations are again in the appendix.
10stance, an increase in the wage gap g both increases the number of individuals
who start education (entry margin) and increases the number of individuals
who reject job oﬀers while in education (dropout margin). Therefore, the
unambiguous eﬀect of an increase in skilled wages is a higher fraction of indi-
viduals in education. What is ambiguous is the implication for the dropout
rate. To see this, consider an increase in the wage gap g: both γd and γe go
down and the shift of γd relative to γe determines whether the dropout rate
F(γd)−F(γe)
1−F(γe) goes up or down.
Conditioning on the values of all other parameters (which uniquely de-
termine the thresholds γe and γd), diﬀerences in the ability distribution
F(γi) will aﬀect the fraction of dropouts. If the group of students hold-
ing a university-entry certiﬁcate is less able in country 1 than in country 2,
then we expect more students to drop out of university. This describes the
selection issue associated with university entry.
113 Conclusion and discussion of applications
We presented a job search model with two skill types, unskilled and skilled,
in which the unskilled (high school graduates) can go to university, and
become skilled (university graduates). The two skill levels are associated
with diﬀerent job market opportunities. Modeling education as a separate
labor market status captures the idea of time-to-educate and endogenizes
the (opportunity) cost of education. Depending on their expected time of
completion, some individuals might drop out of education before obtaining a
degree if they get a job oﬀer. The model is able to explain transitions between
education, employment, and unemployment. The time-to-educate model is
particularly relevant in understanding job search when education/training is
a separate labor market state and when obtaining a degree is time-consuming,
a feature typically neglected in the job search literature.
As one striking empirical example, about 60 percent of all students in
Italy drop out of university before obtaining a degree (see table 1 and Becker,
2001). In accordance with the time-to-educate model, entering university is
the most rational thing to do when faced with the absence of job opportuni-
ties immediately after leaving high school (remember Italy’s extremely high
youth unemployment rate in table 1). The absence of tuition fees is also a
factor in this decision.10 For many students, however, university serves as a
parking lot. They drop out as soon as they get the ﬁrst suitable job oﬀer but
obtain a degree in case they never get a job oﬀer throughout their studies.
Obviously, some students may simply be misguided in going to university,
i.e. are not ’college material’. As empirical evidence of the existence of the
parking lot phenomenon, Becker (2001), using data from the 1998 survey
of high school leavers (Percorsi di studio e di lavoro dei diplomati Indagine
1998) and provided by the Italian National Statistical Oﬃce (Istat), shows
that the vast majority of Italian dropouts give ’accepted job oﬀer’ or ’found
studies too diﬃcult’ as the main explanation for dropping out (alternative
reasons being e.g. ’enlistment to compulsory military service’ and ’personal
motives’). Interestingly, the vast majority of those who found their studies
too diﬃcult, begin working shortly after dropping out, so a large number of
them might not only have dropped out because the studies were too diﬃcult
10Italy only very recently introduced (modest) tuition fees.
12but also because their job prospects were suﬃciently positive.11 The accep-
tance of job oﬀers is therefore the major motive for dropping out of university
in Italy. The time-to-educate model rationalizes the economic mechanisms
behind the parking lot phenomenon.
The time-to-educate model can also be applied to advanced (formal) train-
ing programs later in career. Workers unemployed for some exogenous reason
can search for a new job or opt for a further training program to enhance
their skills. When new job oﬀers are received, a worker in a training program
faces the same choice as a student in university and has to trade oﬀ the costs
and beneﬁts of accepting job oﬀers.12
11This is a standard problem in surveys when only one answer can be given.
12Empirically, in Germany for instance, a considerable number of participants in active
labor market training programs drop out and take up job oﬀers (Personal communication
by Marco Caliendo, DIW, Berlin, based on a yet unpublished paper, June 2005). Evalu-
ation studies typically concentrate on employment outcomes after the (scheduled) end of
a training program and neglect the issue of dropouts.
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We can re-write the left-hand side of equation (10) as a function G(x,γd) where
γd is the dropout threshold and x denotes any of the parameters in the equation.










(r + γd)2be +
γdλsws
(r + γd)(r + λs)
is positive because be ≤ 0. The denominator of (13) is thus always positive. The
sign of γd0(x) will be positive whenever ∂G/∂x is negative and vice versa.
• γd0(wu) > 0 because ∂G/∂wu = −1.
• γd0(ws) < 0 because ∂G/∂ws =
γdλs
(r+γd)(r+λs) > 0.
• γd0(g) < 0 because ∂G/∂g =
γdλswu
(r+γd)(r+λs) > 0.










• γd0(be) < 0 because ∂G/∂be = r
r+γd > 0.
15B Entry margin
We can re-write the left-hand side of equation (12) as a function H(x,γe) where
γe is the (university) enrolment threshold and x denotes any of the parameters in
the equation.










(r + γe + ηu)2 +
r + ηu





(r + γe + ηu)2wu
= −
ber
(r + γe + ηu)2 +
r(λsws − νuwu) + ηuλs(ws − wu)
(r + γe + ηu)2(r + λs)
which is positive because be ≤ 0 and since λsws ≥ ηuwu > 0. The denominator
of (14) is thus always positive. The sign of γe0(x) will be positive whenever ∂H/∂x
is negative and vice versa.





















• γe0(λu) > 0 because ∂H/∂λu = − rwu
r+λ2
u < 0.
• γe0(ηu) ≶ 0 because the sign of








is ambiguous (the ﬁrst and third term are positive, the second is negative).
The most likely case is the case of a positive sign of ∂H/∂ηu, implying
more enrolment when ηu goes up, as one might expect. However, there are
parameter constellations, e.g. when ws (resp. the wage gap g) and λs are
very high, for which an increase in ηu has the counter-intuitive eﬀect of
decreasing enrolment. This is discussed in the main text.
• γe0(be) < 0 because ∂H/∂be = r
r+γe+ηu > 0.
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